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THE COURTS vs. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, 
AND ABORTION. By Edward Keynes' with Randall K. 
Miller.2 Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1989. Pp. 
xx, 400. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $16.95. 
George Steven Swan 3 
Edward Keynes and his former student Randall K. Miller have 
produced a meritorious work divisible into two parts. The first ad-
dresses the constitutional and political history of congressional 
power over the federal judiciary, especially under article III's excep-
tions and regulations clause4 and section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.s This is an extensively-researched, invaluable resource for 
scholars and laWYers. The latter portion reviews the more recent 
congressional efforts to check the federal judiciary by statutes deal-
ing with school prayer, busing, and abortion. 
Inevitably, even so fine a study must contain minor imperfec-
tions in the course of its 312 pages of text and eighty-eight pages of 
notes, cases, and indexing. Unfortunately, there is a pattern in the 
imperfections. Let a few examples suffice. 
Keynes recounts how Radical Republicans in Congress reacted 
to Ex parte Milligan:6 "In the House, Representative John Bing-
ham (R-Ohio) proposed legislation to abolish the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction entirely and a constitutional amendment to 
abolish the Court." Keynes nowhere else identifies Bingham. But 
Bingham was, of course, the author of the fourteenth amendment. 1 
Keynes's study is largely about that amendment: the relationship 
between the Court and Congress over school prayer, busing, and 
abortion. Bingham's beliefs about the scope of congressional au-
thority over the judiciary might help to enlighten readers concern-
ing Congress's power to curb the Court under section five of the 
fourteenth amendment. Keynes's omission of any digression on 
Bingham tends to favor the side of the Supreme Court in the debate 
over Congress's power to curb its jurisdiction. 
I. Professor of Political Science, Penn State University. 
2. Legal Assistant, Atlantic Ritchfield Corporation. 
3. Associate Professor, N.C. A&. T State University School of Business, Greensboro. 
4. "[T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to law and Fact, 
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CoNsr. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
6. 71 u.s. 2 (1866). 
7. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 318-19 (1967). 
1990] BOOK REVIEW 417 
In an excellent 1988 monographs Dean Ralph Rossum assailed 
the views of Irving Brant, who had taken a narrow view of Con-
gress's power to influence policy by manipulating the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Brant had quoted Alexander Hamil-
ton's Number 80 of The Federalist9 in support of Brant's position, 
but omitted this sentence from Hamilton's concluding paragraph, 
discussing the federal judiciary's constitutional powers: "If some 
partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the in-
corporation of any of them into the plan it ought to be recollected 
that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such 
exceptions and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to 
obviate or remove these inconveniences."w Rossum said that Brant 
"engages in a form of academic gerrymandering and he conve-
niently overlooks this passage." 11 
Keynes likewise cites Hamilton in Number 80, and like Brant 
he overlooks the passage emphasized by Rossum. 
Keynes quotes Justice Douglas's footnote in a 1962 dissent 
concurred in by Justice Black, which casts doubt on the continuing 
vitality of Ex parte McCardle:l2 "There is a serious question 
whether the McCardle case could command a majority view to-
day."B Keynes treats that 1962 case as the last major one relating 
to questions of congressional power over the federal courts' jurisdic-
tion. But he overlooks Douglas's 1968 concurrence in F/ast v. Co-
hen:l4 "As respects our appellate jurisdiction, Congress may 
largely fashion it as Congress desires by reason of the express provi-
sions of section 2, Article III. See Ex parte McCardle .... "Is Here 
again, Keynes's oversight tends to favor the side of the Supreme 
Court in the debate over the Congress-Supreme Court power 
relationship. 
Keynes finds no binding Supreme Court decision sustaining the 
plenary theory of congressional power over the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. The Court's various pronouncements suggesting a ple-
nary congressional power are dicta because those cases turned on 
statutory construction rather than the Constitution. Co-author 
Miller finds that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers 
8. Rossum, Congressional Control of the Judiciary: The Article III Option (monograph 
published by The Center For Judicial Studies) (1988). 
9. THE FEDERALIST, No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (New American Library ed. 1961). 
10. /d. at 481 (emphasis in original). 
II. Rossum, supra note 8, at IS n. 99, citing Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional 
Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3, 9 (1973). 
12. 74 u.s. 506 (1869). 
13. Glidden Co. v. Zdansk, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.ll (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
14. 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
15. /d. at 109 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Congress to prevent state interference with constitutional rights, not 
to restrict the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1. 
Keynes and Miller submit that under section 5 Congress can 
only expand, never contract, fourteenth amendment rights. They 
repeatedly cite Justice Brennan's suggestion to that effect for the 
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan.t6 They neglect to note, however, 
that Brennan's Katzenbach suggestion was only a dictum.t7 (Miller 
simply acknowledges in a footnote: "Some antibusing proponents 
have questioned the binding authority of this limitation.") Why do 
the authors treat dicta that favor the Court as binding, while dis-
missing dicta that favor Congress? Here again, the inconsistency 
tends to favor the side of the Supreme Court in the debate over the 
Congress-Supreme Court power relationship. 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Jeremy Wal-
dron.t New York: Oxford University Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 
469. $59.00. 
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. 2 
Some years ago, when there was a plan in the works for tearing 
down a nice old church and replacing it with one of the undist-
inguished structures, part barn and part motel, that were the main-
stay of ecclesiastical architecture at the time, I got together with a 
colleague from the Architecture School to try to put a Historic 
Preservation Ordinance through our City Council. At the time, the 
vicissitudes of local politics had put a Republican in the mayor's 
office and a majority of Republicans on the Council-something 
that had not happened before in my time, and was not to happen 
again. Our ordinance was working its way through the legislative 
process, slowed mainly by the natural mefiance between politicians 
and academics, when the mayor took a good look at it and decided 
that it interfered with rights of property. That was the end of it. 
The conservatism prevailing in city government at the time was not 
for conserving buildings, but for conserving property rights. The 
church came down and was replaced according to plan. 
It is with the right that so concerned the city fathers that Pro-
fessor Jeremy Waldron deals in this lucid and authoritative book. 
16. 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n.IO (1966). 
17. Rossum, supra note 8, at 32. 
I. Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
